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Time is Money: Rational Life Cycle Inertia
and the Delegation of Investment Management
1.

Introduction
Investor inertia, or the tendency to maintain one’s investment portfolio for long periods of

time without changing it, has been interpreted as evidence of irrationality or financial illiteracy.1
In the present paper, by contrast, we incorporate the opportunity cost of time associated with
investment management and show that such inertia can be consistent with optimal behavior.
Additionally, we explain why some investors rationally delegate the responsibility to make their
investment decisions to a financial advisor. To this end, we develop a life cycle model with
rational agents that generates household portfolio inertia patterns consistent with much empirical
evidence.2 In a dynamic consumption and portfolio framework with endogenous labor supply,
we account for time costs devoted to portfolio management. This time becomes particularly
valuable when the individual has the opportunity to accumulate job-specific human capital via
learning by doing. Our structure for financial decision making costs also posits an age-related
time efficiency pattern for financial decision making, in keeping with empirical evidence in
Agarwal et al. (2009), Gamble et al. (2014), and Horn and Cattell (1967). We also evaluate the
role of financial advisors who, for a fee, help investors manage their financial portfolios. This
possibility enables individuals to invest in their job-related human capital and thus to enhance
lifetime earnings.
Several prior studies on portfolio choice have shown that people rarely alter their
financial portfolios. For instance, Bilias et al. (2009) analyzed investor trading behavior in the
1

See Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011; related work includes Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) and Mitchell,
Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi (2006).
2
See for instance Bilias et al. (2009), and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008).
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Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and found that most of stock account owners (up to
70%) exhibited portfolio inertia. They also showed that portfolio inertia followed a U-shaped
profile over the life cycle because younger workers owned almost no stock, while older persons
who did have assets traded them infrequently. Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) studied TIAA-CREF
accountholders over a dozen years, and they noted that 73% of investors never changed their
asset allocation at all, and another 14% rebalanced only once. Agnew et al. (2003) also reported
substantial inertia among investors, particularly in their retirement accounts with close to 90%
never altering their portfolios. Similarly a 2008 survey commissioned by the SEC Office of
Investor Education and Advocacy (OIEA) asked investors how often they traded stocks, bonds,
or mutual funds (outside employer-sponsored retirement accounts), and they found that over 70%
of investors changed their investment allocations at most once a year. In other words, inertia is
the norm for a wide range of investors.3
Notwithstanding this evidence, a large body of research on household finance has focused
on optimal dynamic portfolio allocation patterns selected by rational forward-looking consumers
who decide on their own how to allocate their wealth between stocks and bonds.4 This approach
has been extended to include flexible labor supply decisions.5 Building on these prior studies, we
focus on how the opportunity cost of time devoted to investment management influences
portfolio choice, in the context of endogenous human capital accumulation. This allows us to
diagnose reasons for portfolio inertia and the demand for financial advisors over the life cycle.

3

For additional evidence on this point, see Agnew et al. (2003); Ameriks and Zeldes (2004); Bilias et al. (2009);
Calvet et al. (2009); Choi et al. (2002); Dellavigna and Pollet (2008); the Economist (2011); Madrian and Shea
(2001); and Tang et al. (2010). Barber and Odean (2000) did find evidence of churning among some account holders
at a large discount brokerage company in 1996, yet their unusual sample is not characteristic of typical investors.
4
C.f. Cocco et al. (2005); Gomes and Michaelidis (2003); Horneff et al. (2009); and Cocco and Gomes (2012).
5
Among these are Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992); Chai et al. (2011); and Gomes et al. (2008).
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When investors cannot delegate, young and old investors optimally exhibit inertia, while
middle-aged investors are more active. This is because the young workers have little job-specific
human capital and have the longest time horizon, so they prefer to invest in work skills and
exhibit portfolio inertia. Accordingly, they optimally stay out of the stock market and exhibit
inertia in non-participation. Middle-aged investors with more job-specific human capital have
lower opportunity costs of financial investment. Newly-retired individuals are more active in
managing their portfolios because they no longer forego learning on the job, and they must also
optimally withdraw from their financial accounts before rising inefficiency in portfolio
management and growing mortality risk set in. Later in retirement, older persons are less
involved in trading their financial assets, because growing mortality risk and falling decision
making efficiency render active management costly. Accordingly, different portfolio
management approaches are optimally chosen over the life cycle depending on the investor’s
financial and labor market status. We also find that the average equity share of liquid assets is
hump-shaped with age, consistent with empirical evidence.6
When households have an opportunity to delegate money management, results are rather
different. Overall, we see that access to delegation reduces both inertia and active
self-management. The delegation option is attractive for both young and old investors.
Approximately one-quarter (25%) of investors younger than age 30, 20% of middle-aged
investors (age 30-65), and around 40% of retirees now optimally delegate to financial advisors.
Moreover, access to delegation substantially reduces active management, especially among the
youngest and oldest investors. Active management is adopted by only a small fraction (less than
1%) of the youngest and oldest investors, but by many more of the middle-aged (around 30%)

6

See for example Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and U.S. Census Bureau (2012)
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and early retirees (~50%). Early retirees are the most active investor group because they have no
opportunity cost of forgone labor supply and must optimally withdraw from their financial
accounts to cover consumption. Rather than paying a delegation fee, they instead actively
manage their finances by withdrawing on their own. Later in life, retirees are more likely to
delegate and become less active due to increased mortality risk and decision making inefficiency.
One of our primary research contributions is to model portfolio inertia of individuals who
have free access to the stock market yet still do not touch their portfolios over long periods of
time.7 That is, unlike studies on equity market participation (e.g., Gomes and Michaelides 2005;
Vissing-Jorgensen 2003), we show that, while most individuals (57% in our model) rationally
elect inertia unconditional on stock ownership, many (47%) of stock investors also elect portfolio
inertia. In comparative statics analysis, we also evaluate how initial market participation costs
influence portfolio inertia patterns, and we show such an initial cost need not produce portfolio
inertia among equity owners.
To assess welfare gains of having access to a finanical advisor, we compute the change in
the certainty-equivalent (CE) consumption stream when investors do versus do not have access to
delegation. Using our baseline fee structure, investors having access to financial advice enjoy
greater lifetime welfare by the equivalent of a 1.2% improvement in their annual consumption
streams. We also conduct a sensitivity analysis for different costs of financial advice, to evaluate
investors’ potential welfare gains from lowering entry barriers to financial advisory services. We
conclude that eliminating a minimum fee for advisory services would enhance welfare by 1.43%,
compared to the case where no delegation is available. Overall, lowering the entry barriers to

7

This is consistent with a wide range of empirical findings; see Agnew et al.(2003); Ameriks and Zeldes (2004);
Brunnermeir and Nagel (2008); Calvet et al. (2009a; 2009b); and Dahlquist and Martinez (2015).
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access financial advisors can help people of all ages (and particularly the young and the old) to
better manage their finances and save their scarcest asset, time for accumulating more
job-specific skills or enjoying leisure. Our findings have implications for research and policy
regarding investment management and financial advice.
In what follows, Section 2 describes our specification of the investor’s portfolio problem
when the primary opportunity cost of financial management is the time that could otherwise be
used for job-related human capital accumulation. Section 3 describes the dynamic portfolio
choice problem when invetors have an option to hire financial advisors. Section 4 presents our
calibration of parameters and approach to numerical solution of the model. Section 5 illustrates
results of investors’ portfolio choice problems, first without delegation, and then with the option
of hiring a financial advisor. Section 6 provides sensitivity analysis and evaluates the welfare
impact of delegation. We conclude with a discussion of implications of our findings for investors,
the financial advisory industry, retirement plan sponsors, and policymakers.

2.

Dynamic Portfolio Choice with Inertia
In this section we specify the investor’s problem when allocating his portfolio, on the

assumption that active management of financial assets requires individuals to devote time to the
process.
2.1

Financial Decision Making Efficiency and Time Budgets over the Life Cycle
We posit a consumer dynamically determining his equity share and labor supply over the

life cycle, both of which influence his current and future labor income as well as his financial
wealth. The individual is endowed with a per-period time available (normalized to 1). Before
retirement, he can allocate his time to work in the paid labor market
to leisure

. His decision period

0, 1, … ,

to generate income, or

is measured in years; at

0 he begins

6

his work life at age 20. He also faces mortality risk over the course of his (uncertain) lifetime,
with the maximum age (here set to 100,

80 .

An individual who is not a financial expert will need to devote both time and mental
resources to the task of financial management (Abel et al. 2013; Campbell et al. 2011). This can
be costly, inasmuch as managing financial assets requires collecting and processing information
about market conditions (Christelis et al. 2010), analyzing financial products’ risk/return
characteristics, and evaluating product fee structures (Anagol and Kim 2012). And while there
may be a one-time initial entry cost of equity participation (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), it will still
be necessary each period for investors to expend resources to evaluate changing financial market
conditions and understand new products (Carlin 2009, Carlin and Manso 2011). This imposes on
individuals an opportunity cost each period, inasmuch as labor earnings depend on job-specific
skills derived from work experience.8
We capture the explicit opportunity cost of adjusting one’s portfolio by the fraction of
time

that is devoted to financial decision making. Someone who is not well-informed

about financial markets will need to allocate more time to acquire and process information about
his portfolio. Accordingly, the investor faces the following time budget constraint:
1,
where

(1)

is a variable taking the value of 1 if he actively manages, and 0 otherwise. This time

constraint implies that the investor can make use of his time to either work or enjoy leisure, if he
elects not to actively manage his financial portfolio.
8

There is a vast literature on on-the-job skill acquisition; see for instance Arrow (1962), Becker (1964), Lucas
(1988), and Levitt et al. (2013) among others. Some people may enjoy self-management or believe they can
outperform the market as well as professional investors, though few actually do so in practice: their performance is
often worse than average (Barber and Odean 2000, Lusardi and Mitchell 2007, Mitchell et al. 2009). Additionally,
peoples’ portfolio allocations across mutual funds often produces lower returns due to infrequent rebalancing
(Frazzini and Lamont 2008).

7

We also posit that the time cost of making an efficient financial decision

can vary

with age. Consistent with the economics and neuroscience literatures on decision making (Horn
and Cattell 1967; Agarwal et al. 2009), we suppose that middle-aged investors are more efficient
in managing their wealth than are younger or older individuals. Accordingly, we model the
age-dependent time cost of financial management as a U-shaped function over the life cycle with
the highest efficiency (i.e., lowest

) in middle age.9 This reflects the fact that the young are

cognitively able but inexperienced in the labor force; also older workers have job experience but
may have diminished cognitive ability. Middle-aged investors tend to be at their best, having
gained job experience and not yet experienced cognitive decline. Nevertheless, as investors incur
time costs period when they manage their financial portfolios actively,10 there is no assumed
value of experience in financial management (Chiang et al. 2011).
2.2

The Human Capital Accumulation Process
We posit that job-specific human capital is accumulated through learning by doing. In

keeping with Arrow (1962) and Becker (1964), we denote with

and

, respectively, as the

time devoted to developing job-specific human capital and work time each period. The law of
motion for job-specific human capital is:
1
,

,

,

(2)

is an experience formulation function and

is a depreciation rate 11 for

job-specific human capital. An idiosyncratic temporary shock (

also affects the accumulation

where

level of human capital in the next period.
9

Technically, this inefficiency arises from the complexity that the typical investor faces when implementing his
choices in a dynamic programming problem; see Johnson et al. (2001).
10
In our model the agent must re-solve his life cycle model and implement new choices each period, so he incurs
new time costs every time he engages in active management.
11
This can also be interpreted as a rate of skill obsolescence; that is, some knowledge becomes outdated by the
advent of new technology.

8

This formulation makes clear that work in the current period

not only generates

current labor income but also raises the stock of human capital resulting in higher future labor
income. Previous research on endogenous labor supply in a dynamic portfolio choice model has
incorporated uncertain wage rates as an important source of risk (Bodie et al. 1992, Gomes et al.
2008, Chai et al. 2011), but there the decision to work was assumed to affect only current
income. Since in prior models life cycle wage profiles were assumed to be determined only by
age and exogenous labor market shocks, those studies implicitly assumed that work time
substituted for current leisure time, so the price of leisure was simply the current wage. By
contrast, in what follows, we model investors who know that taking time away from work today
influences their human capital accumulation and hence future labor earnings. Specifically, we
specify the experience acquisition function as follows, following Ben-Porath (1967):
,

(3)

where a is a parameter that represents an individual’s efficiency for accumulating human
capital.12 The elasticity of human capital accumulation
returns to scale
2.3

is assumed to display decreasing

∈ 0,1 .

Labor Income and Asset Returns
Disposable yearly labor income ( ) is determined by the individual’s job-specific human

capital level

, wage shock

, and labor supply ( ):
1

where

1

,

(4)

and τ represent housing expenditures and labor income tax, respectively. The level

of human capital or job-specific skill

plays a role similar to the age-specific deterministic

wage trend in the life cycle literature (Cocco et al. 2005, Gomes et al. 2008, Hubener 2013 et
12

Our notion of human capital is informed by job-specific skills accumulated by working, as in Becker (1964).

9

al.).13 In the present case, however,

is endogenously accumulated over time (i.e., learning by

doing) when the individual works, as per equation (2). The permanent wage shock

≡ log

follows a random walk process and is influenced by an idiosyncratic shock (Carroll 1997, Cocco
where

et al. 2005)

~

0.5
~

log normally distributed with

,

0.5

. The transitory wage shock (
,

. After the (exogenous) age-65

45 , the individual stops working (

retirement age (

) is

0 and receives a lifelong pension

benefit equal to a fraction of his final labor earnings.
Two asset classes are available for the consumer’s investment portfolio: riskless bonds
and risky stocks. Bonds have a constant annual real gross return of
stock gross return

in all periods. The real

is assumed to be serially independent and identically log normally

distributed with parameters

and

, implying that log

~

,

.14 The correlation

between the stock log return and the innovation to the permanent wage shock is denoted by
We denote

as the stock gross return from time

to

.

1, so that the fraction of the

individual’s wealth invested in stocks is determined in period , and returns are realized in
1. Following Gomes et al. (2003), we consider a proportional rate τ applied to all asset returns
1

the household receives. Therefore the after-tax bond return is given by
τ

and the after-tax stock return is given by

1

1 1

1 1

τ .

2.4 Preferences
As in Gomes et al. (2008), we suppose the investor has a standard time-separable power
utility function defined over a composite good consisting of current consumption
13

and time

Indeed below we estimate the parameters of a human capital accumulation process by matching the
model-generated moments with that of the age-specific deterministic wage profile in Hubener et al. (2013).
14
Tang et al. (2010) report that people receive lower returns when they manage their own portfolios, compared to
having professionals manage them. For simplicity, we assume that equity returns are the same for all portfolio
management methods (inertia, active management, and delegation).
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devoted to leisure

, which is given in period by

,

0

. Here

captures the investor’s preference for leisure relative to consumption. The parameter

measures

relative risk aversion.
2.5

Wealth Dynamics and Portfolio Inertia vs. Active Management
The investor is assumed to have a stock market account and a bond market account.15 In

each period , the investor needs to decide how much to consume ( ) from his available total
wealth (or cash on hand,
(

), and how much to invest in the stock market for the next period

0). The remaining wealth is invested in bonds (

). Let

be the balance

of his stock market account at time . The dynamic budget constraint and evolution of wealth
can then be formulated as follows:
(5)
(6)
(7)
The stock balance

in period

1 is determined by his previous period’s stock

investment choice ( ) and stock market return (

). The next period’s total wealth (

) is

the sum of realized financial investment (stock account plus bond account balances) and labor
earnings ( ). Depending on how the investor elects next period’s stock investment, we have two
cases.

15

We could have considered three accounts, namely a brokerage account for stock investment, a savings account for
bond investments, and a checking account for consumption as in Abel et. al (2013). In our study, however, the focus
is not on the transaction costs of transferring between checking and investment accounts (i.e., stock and bond
investment accounts). Moreover, evidence on investor inertia also suggests that investors are not greatly affected by
transactions costs (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008). Additionally, most banks provide free transfers between savings
and checking accounts, and money market funds provide bond returns while allowing frequent withdrawals. Thus,
here we focus on a case where investors can consume from their total liquid assets (stock+bond+labor earnings) and
incur time costs when collecting or processing information to manage their stock/bond portfolios.

11

Inertia (

): The investor exhibits portfolio inertia in period

when he retains his current

stock balance for the next period. This is equivalent to passively electing the current stock
balance as his new investment choice (

), i.e. there are no withdrawals from or new

investments into the stock account. In so doing, he incurs no time cost for financial decision
making

0 that he would otherwise devote to collecting and analyzing new financial

information to implement the change. Accordingly, someone electing portfolio inertia has the
following budget and time constraints:
(8)
1

(9)
(10)

Also, when electing inertia, the investor does not finance his current consumption by liquidating
part of his stock account, which makes the consumption constraint more binding (C
Of course his next-period balance in the stock account (
period ( ) because of uncertain investment returns
Active management

Z ).

) may differ from that of the prior
.

: The investor exhibits active portfolio management in period

when he explicitly chooses an investment amount in stocks; that is, he makes additional
investments into or takes withdrawals from his stock account based on his investment decisions.
Accordingly, the amount invested in stocks for the next period can differ from the current stock
balance

. 16 In return, the investor must incur (age-dependent) time costs

0 in

this period.17 The wealth and time budget constraints evolve as follows:

16

Conceptually it would be possible for an active investor to choose to buy and sell exactly the same amount as his
current stock balance, but this case is not interesting from a modeling perspective and eliminated in the optimization
process of investors.
17
The recurring time cost (or cognitive attention/resources) for gathering and processing information for financial
management is also consistent with a recent literature on optimal inattention and economic decision making (e.g.,

12

(11)
1

(12)
(13)

Optimization: By defining inertia as a situation where the investor does not alter his
stockholdings, we treat the stock account balance ( ) as a state variable within a dynamic
optimization framework. This is because it is necessary for the investor to know his current stock
balance before deciding whether to leave it as is (i.e.,

), or to actively evaluate some
, accumulated human capital

different allocation. Other state variables include total wealth
, and the wage shock

. There are also four choice variables: the portfolio management

method (i.e., portfolio inertia or active management), labor supply
the next period

, and consumption

, stock holdings going into

.

Because the portfolio management method is a discrete choice variable, we formulate the
investors’ problem in a dynamic discrete choice model (Adda and Cooper 2000). We define
,

,

,

as the investor’s discounted lifetime utility when he actively manages his
,

portfolio; similarly,

,

,

denotes his discounted lifetime utility when he elects

portfolio inertia. Then the value function at time
,
Let

,

,

≡

is specified as:
,

1 be the investor’s time preference and

,

,

,

,

,

,

.

(14)

the probability that he survives to the next

period. Then the value function for active management is as follows:18

Abel et al., 2013, Sims 2003), learning (Sargent 1993, Evans and Honkapohja 2001), and robust control (e.g.,
Giannoni 1999, Hansen and Sargent 2001, Onatski and Stock 1999).
18
We could introduce a direct transaction cost
,
for portfolio adjustment, in which case the equation for
total wealth would be W
,
. Nevertheless, we do not focus here
on direct monetary costs; see Bonaparte and Cooper (2009) and Campanale et al. (2012) for more on that approach.

13

,

,

,

max

,

, ,

,

,

,

. .
(15)
1

,

1.
The value function for portfolio inertia is as follows:
,

,

,

max

,

,

,

,

,

. .
(16)
1

,

1.
When an investor elects portfolio inertia, he does not need to re-maximize the value function with
respect to stock holdings; instead, he takes his current stock balance
stock investment (S ). If

as his next period’s

, the investor opts for active management

; otherwise,

he opts for portfolio inertia.
The two value functions differ due to their different time constraints and next period’s
portfolio choice. The appeal of portfolio inertia is that the time saved can then be used either to
work and accumulate more human capital, thereby raising future earnings, or to enjoy more
leisure. During retirement, the investor does not work, so if he decides to actively manage his

14

portfolio, he sacrifices only his leisure time. Later in retirement, decreasing financial decision
making efficiency and rising mortality risk make inertia more appealing.19

3. The Role of Financial Advisors and Dynamic Portfolio Choice with Delegation
Next we extend the model to examine how introducing financial advisors can add value to
life cycle decision makers. Reasons for delegating portfolio management can include time costs,
efficiency gains due to lower transaction costs, and beliefs regarding professional managers’
skills. In what follows, we focus mainly on the investor’s forgone opportunity to accumulate
more human capital associated with active management during the work life.
When an investor elects to delegate his portfolio management to an advisor, he must pay a
management fee from his wealth (

). In the financial advisory service industry, the fee

generally consists of a minimum fixed fee

plus a percentage fee

charged on total

assets under management.20 Formally, this structure may be expressed as follows:
max

,

.

(17)

The financial advisor not only selects the individual’s investment portfolio, but he also proposes
optimal levels of consumption and labor supply that are in the client’s best interest.21 The value
function for the delegated portfolio management method is then:
,

,

,

max

, ,

. .

19

,

,

,

,
(18)

Sufficient conditions for the selection of portfolio inertia are discussed in Appendix B.
See Appendix A for a dicussion of the fee structures usedby SEC-registered investment advisors (RIA) in the U.S.
21
We do not model a possible conflict of interest between clients and financial advisors, which was analyzed by
Sharpe (1985), Stoughton et al. (2011), Ou-Yang (2003), and Mullainathan et al. (2012), among others.
20

15

1

,

1
Note that the investor pays the management fee
any time cost

out of his total wealth, but he does not incur

. The advantage of hiring the financial advisor is either more leisure or the saved

time which can then be used to work and accumulate more job-specific knowledge.
Accordingly, the investor’s optimization problem of finding the best portfolio
management method can be summarized as:

,

,

,
,

, , ,

,

,

,

. .

(19)

1

,
1
0

where

0 denotes portfolio inertia,

financial advisor.
portfolio inertia case,

≡

,

,

1 active management, and
where

is the value function for the

is the value function for active management, and

function for delegating portfolio management.

2 hiring a

is the value

16

4

Model Calibration and Solution

4.1 Numerical Procedure for the Model Solution
In our model, there is no simple Euler equation linking the marginal benefit of today’s
portfolio adjustment with future marginal benefits, inasmuch as the investor is unsure about
which portfolio management method he will select at each point in the future. For this reason, it
is intractable to solve the model in a closed form. We therefore solve the model numerically via
backward induction, multi-linear interpolation, and Monte-Carlo integration (see Appendix C for
details).
4.2 Parameter Calibration
We calibrate the model using a reasonable set of base case parameters, setting the
discount factor

to 0.96, the coefficient of relative risk aversion to

preference parameter to

3, and the leisure

1.0, as is conventional in other life cycle studies (see Gomes et al.

2008; Chai et al. 2011; and Cocco and Gomes 2012). One-period survival rates

in the utility

function are calculated from the 2009 US Social Security Administration Trustees Report cohort
mortality table for males born in 1990 (Bell and Miller 2012).
An important element of the model is the human capital accumulation process (

), which

generates the opportunity cost of time when an investor elects to actively manage his financial
assets. As noted above, accumulated human capital serves a similar role as the age-dependent
wage profile in prior studies. To this end, we calibrate the human capital accumulation process by
matching the model-generated moments with those of an age-dependent wage rate profile for
male high school graduates derived from PSID data (as in Hubener et al. 2013).22 Based on this
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Technically, we implement a simulated method of moment procedure (SMM) by numerically minimizing the
distance of various moments (i.e., mean, standard deviation, median, skewness, kurtois, max, min and the age of
maximum wage) of the simulated human capital accumulation process given in equations (2) and (3) relative to the

17

moment-matching process, we find that human capital
0.16%

0.023595

function is set to

depreciates at an annual rate of

; the elasticity parameter in the experience accumulation

0.0462; and the accumulation rate to

shocks to human capital follow an iid lognormal distribution

0.7596. The idiosyncratic
~

0.5·0.0434 , 0.0434 .

The standard deviation of the permanent wage shock is 0.0710 and the pre-retirement transitory
wage shock standard deviation is 0.1726; in retirement it is 0.28 (as in Love 2010). The
post-retirement shocks may be interpreted as income or consumption surprises due to unexpected
out-of-pocket medical expenses or long-term care expenses.
Retirement benefits are assumed to replace 50% of the individual’s last labor income
0.2

(

45, 46, … ,

. This formulation generates higher (lower) replacement rates

for workers with lower (higher) average career earnings, consistent with the progressive benefit
rules of the U.S. Social Security system (Chai et al. 2011). The riskless asset return is set to 1.01%
and the risk premium for stocks is 4% with a standard deviation of 20.5% (Cocco et al. 2005).
Labor income is taxed at 30% during working period and 15% after retirement. Capital gains are
taxed at 20%. These rates reflect effective tax rates typical household faces in U.S. (Gomes et al.
2008).
So that the calibration embodies relatively realistic delegation fees, we have collected and
analyzed advisory charges of registered investment advisors (RIAs) reporting to the US. Security
and Exchange Commissions (SEC).23 We focus on retail-oriented advisors charging a percent of
total assets under management (AUM), as this is the most common form of fee (see Appendix A

(deterministic) age-dependent wage profile used in the literature (Gomes et al. 2008; Hubener et al. 2013). A more
detailed explanation of this procedure appears in Appendix D.
23
Registered Investment Advisors (RIAs) in the U.S. must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
before they can provide advice on financial investments including stocks, bond, and mutual funds. They can also
help implement clients’ optimal portfolio choices; see Mitchell and Smetters (2013). See also Appendix A..
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for more detail). Since these fees average 1.41% per year, our baseline calibration uses this level
(

1.41% . To cover fixed costs of advisory service, financial advisors often stipulate a

minimum balance they require if they are to take on the client for a percentage fee. Below that
level, they charge a fixed fee calculated as a set percentage times the minimum required account
balance. For retail-oriented advisors, the minimum required account balances average about
$240,000, which translates into a fixed fee level of $3,400. Such a high threshold for delegation
will discourage most consumers from delegation in the real world and in our model. 24
Accordingly, for the baseline case below, we explore investors’ choice of a delegation option by
setting the minimum fee at
balance of $150,000

$2,115 (commensurate with a minimum required account

1.41%). In sensitivity analysis, we also analyze how different fixed fees

affect investor behavior and welfare.
The efficiency function for financial decision making is assumed to be convex, as
discussed above. Investors around age 50 are assumed to be most financially savvy with
0.03; that is, they sacrifice only 3% of their normalized time to manage their own
portfolios. Our time cost estimate of 3% is based on the American Time Use Survey (ATUS
2012), where people spend an average of 0.35 hours a day on financial management, or around 3%
of the 13 hours of daily discretionary time (calculated by deducting time spent on necessary
activity such as sleeping, eating/drinking, essential household activities, and caring for household
0.09) than the middle-aged.

members). Young investors are assumed to be less efficient (
The functional form for efficiency is assumed to be

.

.

30

0.03, where

the 4th power generates modest efficiency pattern changes around middle-age. In a later section,

24

This is one reason that our baseline model without a delegation option appears realistic for the majority of
real-world investors.
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we also conduct sensitivity analysis assuming different levels and shapes for the active
management inefficiency function. Baseline parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 here

5. Results and Discussion
We next describe investor behavior when no delegation option is available, and after that,
we report results when individuals can elect and delegate money matters to a financial advisor.
We use the optimal controls of the baseline parameterization to generate 2,000 simulated
lifetimes reflecting realizations of stock returns and labor income shocks. All investors begin
with a zero stock account balance (i.e., no inheritance,

,

0).

5.1 Profiles for Consumption, Wealth, Earnings, Stock Holdings, and Labor Supply: No
Delegation Option
Figure 1 summarizes our baseline results for the key choice variables (consumption,
wealth, labor supply, and earnings) when delegation is not an option. Panel A indicates that the
model generates hump-shaped wealth, earnings, and consumption profiles over the life cycle,
consistent with those reported in other studies (e.g., Gomes et al. 2008). Consumption drops
sharply at age 66 when households retire and begin to consume more leisure. Such a profile is in
line with other life cycle models with endogenous work hours (Chai et al., 2011); it is also in line
with empirical studies documenting a substantial decline in spending around the retirement date
(Battistin et al. 2009). Panel B illustrates the average stock balance which also traces out a
hump-shaped pattern over the life cycle. Starting with no stock balance, individuals then invest
more in the stock market until they retire, after which they gradually decrease their exposure to
stocks. This result is consistent with empirical findings of a hump-shaped equity share profile
along with a hump-shaped wealth profile over the life cycle (Ameriks and Zeldes 2004). Panel C
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traces the labor supply pattern which is slightly hump-shaped over time. Average lifetime labor
supply equals 0.35, which corresponds to about 1,820 work hours per year (assuming a time
endowment of 100 waking hours per week). This is similar to prior work (see Gomes et al. 2003
and 2008, Chai et al. 2011) and it is also in line with empirical evidence for U.S. workers.25. On
average, the stock of human capital rises with age, but at a decreasing rate.
Figure 1 here
5.2 Portfolio Inertia and Equity Choices: No Delegation Option
Figure 2 shows optimal choice patterns of portfolio management method and equity
holdings over the life cycle when delegation is unavailable. Panel A illustrates how people
optimally manage their portfolios depending on whether inertia or active management dominates.
As is evident, inertia is the dominant strategy for young investors to about age 30; thereafter,
active management becomes more prevalent until retirement, whereupon even more switch to
active management early in retirement (the fraction of active managing investors rises from
around half at age 64 to about 60% at age 65). Later in life, people again revert to inertia.
Figure 2 here
The reason for this pattern is that the young have little financial wealth, but they will need
forgo much human capital investment when they devote time to manage their meager financial
assets. They also have a longer horizon over which they can use their human capital to generate
labor earnings. Conversely, later in life, people have more wealth and a smaller opportunity cost
of time. This is because they have a shorter work lives remaining and have already accumulated
substantial human capital. Accordingly, sacrificing a small amount of time to manage their
25

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS Economic releases Table B-2) report average weekly working
hours of 34.6 hours. The OECD documents about 1,800 annual working hours for U.S. workers
("http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS"), which is similar value reported by Low
(2005) using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
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finances has only a modest impact on their wages. Still, however, almost half of the middle-aged
group does not change portfolio allocations; such a high level of inactivity is consistent with
several empirical studies (Ameriks and Zeldes 2004; Bilias et al. 2009; Calvet et al. 2009a;
Mitchell et al. 2007; and Vissing-Jorgensen 2003). Among the older group with lower wealth,
their reduced decision making efficiency and increased mortality risk somewhat depresses their
interest in active management. Early in retirement, older people are much more likely to switch
to active management to rebalance their portfolios, now that they have more free time. The
fraction of actively managing investors thus jumps from 50% at age 64 to about 60% at age 65.
As time goes by, however, reduced wealth and income shrink the budget constraint for
consumption, which in turn reduces utility from actively managing financial assets. Additionally,
rising mortality risk boosts their preference for current consumption and leisure. These factors all
lead to more inertia later in life.
Our U-shaped pattern of portfolio inertia is compatible with available empirical evidence.
For instance, in our model, young investors who start with a zero stock account balance remain
out of the stock market (i.e. S

Z

0). This is consistent with results in the PSI from Bilias et

al. (2009). Our model also implies that middle-aged and older investors are more likely to
particpate in the market, but older investors exhibit more inertia. This conforms to evidence from
Bilias et al. (2009) who showed that the conditional probability of inertia is lower for the middle
aged, whereas older investors are less likely to trade than the middle-aged even when they hold
stocks.26

26

In sum, our baseline settings appear to be in line with empirically-observed U-shaped

In an untabulated analysis of our simulated data, we find that young investors, conditional on holding
stocks, are more likely to trade compared to middle-aged investors consistent with the PSID data (Bilias et
al. 2009).
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inertia patterns. Young investors tend not to hold stocks, and older investors do but tend not to
trade.
It is also of interest to note that our overall inertia levels are comparable to the empirical
findings reported by Bilias et al. (2009). For instance, across all age groups, they find 40-70%
inertia among stock owners (depending on the survey year); our model generates 47% inertia
among those who own stocks (and 57% unconditional on stock ownership). If we were to use a
the narrower definition of inertia meaning no trading in a five-year time span, our model
generates 33% inertia conditional on stock holding, close to the 39-56% fraction over a five-year
period in the data.
Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates the fraction of financial wealth invested in equity changes
over the life cycle when no delegation option is available.27 The solid line reflects the average
fraction in equities for the subgroup of inertia investors. The dotted line refers to the
corresponding equity share for active investors (the overall average is indicated by the dashed
line). Consistent with most prior life cycle models with uncertain labor income, active investors
hold almost 100% of their savings in equity early in life, and glide down to lower shares as they
age. The explanation is that future labor income can be thought of as a implicit bond position, so
workers will seek to diversify their overall wealth position consisting of human capital and
financial wealth. Conditional on becoming active, they follow the traditional investment strategy
recommended by previous life cycle studies (as in Cocco et al. 2005; and Merton 1971). By
contrast, inertia investors allocate less to equity when young and invest more in equity when old.
This is because young investors start with a zero stock balance and little wealth, so they are more
likely to choose inertia and hence invest nothing in equity. As they accumulate wealth, they begin

27

In our notation, the equity share of each investor is defined as

⁄

.
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to manage more actively and accumulate equity. Between age 30 and 60, the equity fraction of
the inertia investor is rather flat, at around 60%. Interestingly, at retirement there is a sharp drop
of the equity fraction for inertia investors. The reason is that early retirees reallocate substantial
amounts of equities once toward bonds before they start to draw down during retirement. This, in
turn, can be explained by the fact that older investors facing rising mortality risk and more
inefficiency in financial decision making understand that active financial management implies
rising opportunity costs.28 Because inertia-investors gradually deplete their wealth from their
bond accounts and defer selling off their equity accounts, their equity share increases over time in
later years.
Overall, combining the cases of inertia and active-management investors, we observe that
the average equity share (the dashed line in Figure 2, Panel B) rises for younger individuals and
declines steadily afterwards. Although those electing active management at older ages optimally
choose lower equity shares, the fact that older inertia investors retain a high equity share implies
that stock holdings do not decline sharply with age. In sum, in our model people optimally do not
invest in stocks early in their life, but in middle age they gradually move into stock, and then they
curtail stockholdings later in life, while still retaining a reasonable share.
Figure 3 displays scatter plots of stock account balances for active and inertia investors;
the solid line indicates average stock balances in each case. It is clear that those active managers
hold more in equities than do inertia investors. Individuals having greater equity exposure find it
optimal to allocate more time to portfolio management and become active investors. Nevertheless,
the average does not imply that all inertia investors eschew equities. In fact, as the right panel in
Figure 3 illustrates, a large group of those who are inactive still hold substantial stock positions.
28

The gradual decumuation of assets from the bond account is not due to time costs, in contrast to
transactions from the stock account.
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If an investor expects he will end up choosing a similar consumption/labor supply pair next
period, a small change in his portfolio will be costly without enhancing his discounted lifetime
utility. In such a case, it will then be optimal for him not to alter his portfolio (Appendix B
discusses a sufficient condition for inertia choice).
Figure 3 here
Table 2 illustrates how portfolio inertia and equity trading patterns vary over the life cycle.
We also show how patterns differ by wealth level (above and below $150,000), to illustrate how
wealth is related to portfolio management choice and subsequent trading patterns. Some
two-thirds (67%) of the lower wealth middle-aged investors elect inertia, while only one-fifth
(20%) of the same age group with more than $150,000 elect inertia. This pattern confirms to our
model of the opportunity costs of active financial management: low-wealth investors do not
sacrifice time to manage their accounts, while wealthier individuals do. Table 2 also shows that
the factors driving active management vary over the work life. Active investors buy stocks while
young and sell their stocks while old. In the 20-35 age range, almost two-thirds (62%) of wealthy
investors buy equities seeking to capture the equity premium; in their 60s and 70s, almost 60%
actively sell stocks to finance consumption.
Table 2 here
Table 3 presents summary statistics concerning the dynamics of portfolio management
methods when no delegation option is feasible. On average, the first time that people elect active
management is about nine years after entering the labor force. They elect inertia for 46 years and
manage their own portfolios for 34 years, altering their management strategies 12 times over their
lifetimes. Some 12% of people (=1-[1,767/2,000]) never elect active management and remain
inactive throughout their entire lifetimes.
Table 3 here
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5.3 Portfolio Management: With a Delegation Option
Next we turn to an evaluation of how portfolio management methods change optimally
when a financial advisor is available. Table 4 summarizes results. On average, investors now
change their portfolio management approach much more often, almost 19 times over their lives
(18.82, versus 11.55 in Table 3), and they elect inertia for a shorter period (44.94 years, versus
45.97 in Table 2). Of most interest is the fact that people devote about half as many years to
active management (17.69 versus 34.03 previously), and they engage advisors for just under
one-quarter of their adult lives (=17.36 years/80). Investors begin to delegate relatively soon,
only 8.39 years from starting work, and about 80% of people elect to delegate at some point
(79%=1,581/2,000). Additionally, when delegation is an option, fewer choose active
management and those who do, begin later, 14.31 years after starting work (versus 8.95 in Table
3).
Table 4 here
Table 5 shows what happens when investors can delegate their investment management to
a financial advisor. Panel A illustrates patterns of portfolio managment methods by age, where
we see that access to delegation reduces inertia and active-management, compared to the findings
in Figure 2. Delegation is attractive for investors of all ages: approximately 19% of investors
younger than age 35, 2% of middle-aged investors (age 30-65), and around 37% of old retirees
(age 80+) now optimally delegate to a financial advisor. Access to delegation substantially
reduces active management, especially among the youngest and oldest investors. Active
management is adopted by only a small fraction of the youngest (8%) and oldest investors (2%),
but by many more (around 30%) middle-aged and early retirees (about 50%). Early retires
become the most active investor group because they have no opportunity cost of forgone labor
supply and must optimally withdraw from their stock accounts to meet retirement consumption
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needs. Rather than paying a delegation fee, they instead actively manage their stock accounts by
withdrawing before mortality risk rises, and prior to a decline in decision making efficiency.
Table 5 here
Panel B of Table 5 decomposes portfolio management methods when the delegation
option is available. Among those initially electing inertia or active management, younger and
older investors are more likely to switch to delegation. Among middle-aged individuals (36-65),
active investors are more likely to continue with active management. This pattern is related to the
opportunity cost of time. Young investors, who have the longest horizon to earn human capital
returns, find it optimal to elect the delegation option. Older investors facing high mortality risk
and inefficiency of financial management also favor financial advisors, to save them leisure time.
By contrast, middle-aged investors with high wealth and human capital face a lower opportunity
cost of time, and hence they will manage their portfolios themselves and avoid paying the
delegation fee. Early retirees are more likely to engage in active management as they need not
worry about accumulating job-specific skills any more. It should be noted that the decision to
delegate among the young and old investors is affected by the assumption regarding a required
minimum fixed fee: some inertia investors cannot gain access to financial advisors, as they have
insufficient wealth. Below we discuss how lowering the minimum fixed fee shapes investors’
decisions to hire an advisor.
Panel C of Table 5 represents the average fraction of savings invested in equities,
depending on whether the investor elected inertia, active management, or delegation. For
investors choosing active management, the fraction of savings invested in equity follows an
age-related glide path consistent with the traditional portfolio choice literature. Inertia investors
hold little equity when young and more equity when old, similar to the no delegation case.
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Interestingly, the delegated portfolio also follows a downward-sloping glide path, but the slope is
flatter.
Table 6 summarizes changes in behavior when a delegation option is available for wealth,
equity share, labor income, labor supply, human capital, and consumption by age. All are
expressed as a percent of the no-delegation base case. Results show that having access to an
advisor increases wealth by 0.5-1.7% across age groups. This is due to the higher equity share
noted above, and also to spending more time on the job which builds human capital. Having
access to an advisor also increases leisure around 2-4% during the work and about 7% in
retirement, and raises consumption considerably among the young.
Table 6 here
5.4 Determinants of Portfolio Management Methods
Next we use descriptive multinomial Logit regressions to summarize the factors
associated with investors’ portfolio management methods in our simulated data. Tables 7 and 8
show how the probability of choosing inertia over active management when a delegation option
is (or is not) available, is associated to lagged wealth, stock market shocks, and wage shocks.
Tables 7 and 8 here
When no delegation is feasible, wealthier investors are less likely to engage in inertia as
indicated in the first column of Table 7 and consistent with empirical findings (Agnew et al. 2003,
Bilias et al. 2008, and Calvet et al. 2009). This is because sticking to a non-optimal level of
equity exposure is more costly for them, compared to the less wealthy. The second column
indicates that investors experiencing negative stock market shocks and positive wage shocks are
more likely to elect portfolio inertia, due to their need to invest more in human capital and avoid
risky equity. Investors experiencing good labor market shocks elect inertia rather than actively
managing their assets, as their opportunity costs of active management are higher. Having a
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lagged negative stock market shock reduces investor overall wealth, which subsequently
decreases their interest in actively managing their portfolios. The third column includes all
regressors, and results are similar.
A similar analysis but now allowing delegation is provided in Table 8. Panel A uses
active management as the reference group; as before, wealthier individuals are less likely to
engage in inertia. Comparing delegation and active management, people with additional wealth
would like to choose active management. Although wealthy investors have more need to delegate,
they also must pay higher delegation fees; in our model, the cost outweighs the benefits. Negative
stock market shocks make inertia more attractive than active management, as before, but they
also enhance the appeal of delegation over active management because people find it optimal to
pay a delegation fee given their lower wealth rather than incurring the opportunity time cost.
Positive wage shocks lead investors to choose inertia over active management, but they
have two offsetting effects on the delegation versus active management decision. A positive wage
shock increases the opportunity cost of active management, but it also increases the advisory fee
due to higher wealth levels. Our analysis shows that the opportunity cost saving is more
influential than the wealth effect. In sum, negative wealth or stock return shocks, or positive labor
earnings surprises, lead investors to select inertia or delegation, and to avoid active management.
Panel C of Table 8 uses inertia as the reference group, where we now see that wealthy
investors are more likely to choose delegation rather than inertia because suboptimal portfolio
choice is more costly to them, compared to their poorer counterparts. Positive stock market
surprises increase wealth so the cost of inertia rises, boosting demand for delegation. At the same
time, however, this also means they will pay more in fees, due to their greater wealth. In our
analysis, these costs and benefits offset each other, so positive stock surprises do not provide an
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unambiguous prediction about the choice between delegation vs. inertia. Investors experiencing a
positive labor earnings shock are more likely to choose inertia over delegation.
Comparing Panels A and B of Table 8, we can highlight what drives investors’
preferences for the three portfolio management methods given shocks. Favorable wealth shocks
lead to an overall preferred ordering of active management, delegation, and inertia. Positive stock
surprises make active management more attractive than delegation or inertia, without a clear
ranking of the latter two methods. In response to a favorable labor earnings development,
investors order the options as inertia, delegation, and active management.

6. Sensitivity Analysis and Welfare Gains from Access to Financial Advice
6.1 Examining the Impact of Learning by Doing
To more clearly illustrate the importance of learning by doing in our model, we next
conduct a sensitivity analysis by building and solving a model without the learning by doing
mechanism used in our base case above. To do so, we restate the human capital function as
follows:
1
The experience accumulation part

(20)

.
,

in our original human capital accumulation process
,

is now replaced by a deterministic function of age with parameters (
re-estimate parameters of this new human capital process (δ ,

,

,

,

,

). We then

, ) along with

parameters of wage rate shocks (transitory and permanent wage shock) by matching the model’s
moment conditions with the moments of empirically-observed wage profiles of male high school
graduates derived using the PSID (Hubener et al. 2013).29
29

The estimated values are -0.0125 (δ ), -0.00012542 (δ ), 0.0011 (a ), -0.0080 (a ), 0.000081419 (a ), 6.49 % (λ),

30

Having turned off learning by doing, we next re-solve the model and compare results with
our benchmark case (see Table 9). Before discussing findings, it is useful to note that there are
two competing forces driving inertia when there is no learning by doing. The first is the reduced
opportunity cost of active management which boosts active management (i.e., decreases inertia):
an investor managing his own assets must sacrifice only current leisure time or earnings, but not
future human capital. The second results from the reduced attractiveness of work given that
employment no longer enhances future wages. This reduces labor supply and earnings as well as
wealth, which in turn makes active management less profitable; the result is to discourage active
management (i.e., increase inertia).
Table 9 here
Column 2 of Table 9 show that the latter effect dominates, with an overall increase in
inertia. Compared to the baseline (Column 1), the inertia fraction rises, on average, by 12.1%,
11.3%, and 9.7% for ages 20-45, 45-60, and 65+, respectively. Additionally, labor supply falls by
about 39% for those age 20-45 and 23% for those age 45-60. As anticipated, young investors
respond to the attractiveness of future labor market prospect more sensitively.
6.2 The Impact of the Initial Stock Market Participation Cost
Next we extend our model to include a fixed initial cost of stock market participation (as
in Cocco 2005, Gomes and Michaelides 2005). Because our model already has a stock account
balance (Z ) as a state variable, we can define initial stock market participation as the case when
the investor’s current period’s stock balance (Z

is zero, but his chosen stock investment (S

out of savings is positive. This permits us to avoid creating an additional state variable.30

30.78% (transitory wage shock), 6.87% (permanent wage shock).
30
This specification cannot rule out the possibility that an investor would need to incur participation costs again
when he returns to stock market after liquidating his entire equity position. However our simulation results show that
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We model the fixed market participation cost as a fraction of the permanent wage shock
(as in Gomes and Michaelides 2005). Given an initial fixed cost of stock market participation,
wealth evolves as follows:
,

where

,

is a permanent wage shock and

participation having 1 when Z
fixed cost

0 and S

,

,

(21)

is an indicator variable for initial stock market
0. As in Gomes and Michaelides (2005), the

is set at 2.5% of the permanent wage shock. Column 3 of Table 9 presents the

result of portfolio management methods with initial participation cost. The new solution shows
that overall pattern of inertia over the life cycle is same as before and the proportion of inertia
managers increases only marginally in the early years. In the first 20 years, initial participation
costs increases inertia only by 1.8%; after that the impact becomes minimal. In other words, an
initial participation cost cannot fully explain observed inertia patterns in the data.
We also conduct a test to determine whether the U-shaped time cost is responsible for the
the U-shaped pattern of inertia over the life cycle. Our analysis shows that this is not the case. For
instance, when we set the time cost at 3% for all ages, column 4 of Table 9 shows that 70% of
young investors (age 20-35) choose inertia, 49% of middle-aged investors (ages 50-65), 40% of
early retirees (age 65-80), and 55 % of old investors (age 80+). The ratio of inertia investors is
slightly lower for the youngest and oldest investors, compared to the baseline case, but the
U-shaped pattern is still clearly evident.
Column 5 of Table 9 presents a sensitivity analysis for college graduates, to evaluate how
wage/age profiles influences results. We re-estimate parameters of the human capital process
with the observed wage trend for college graduates in the PSID and re-solve the model.

the fraction of returning stock investors is minimal to none (zero in 2,000 simulations).
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Compared to the baseline case of high school graduates, college graduates earn higher labor
income, have higher wealth, work more, and invest more in equity. Compared to the baseline
case, the inertia level for college grads is modestly less than for the high school educated: 73% vs
76% for ages 20-35, 46% vs. 50% for ages 50-65, and 40% vs. 44% for ages 80+). The U-shaped
pattern of inertia again persists.
6.3 Welfare Analysis of a Delegation Option and Sensitivity Analysis
To assess how consumers value access to a delegation option, we next compare donsumer
welfare in a delegation regime versus that in a no-delegation world. We measure this in terms of
a certainty equivalent (CE) consumption stream change, or the stream of consumption that would
afford the investor the same level of expected lifetime utility if he lacked access to the delegation
option, versus having it (Cocco et al. 2005).
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Table 10, Panel A, shows for our baseline

specification (Column 1) that providing investors with access to a financial advisor increases
lifetime welfare by the equivalent of a 1.2% enhancement in their annual consumption streams.
This is similar in magnitude to that reported in Cocco et al. (2005), who compared welfare levels
in two worlds, one with a fixed and the other with a flexible equity share.
Table 10 here
We also conduct a sensitivity analysis for different costs of financial advice, to evaluate
investors’ potential welfare gains from lowering entry barriers to financial advisory services. As
noted above, current industry practice is to set a minimum fixed fee commensurate with a
31

The certainty equivalent constant consumption stream
,

,

1

,

1

1

where ∗ is a fixed level of leisure and
manipulation, we get:

In calculating this measure, we set leisure

is defined as:

∗

1
,

,

,

∗

is a pair of state variables. With some algebraic

1
∑
∏
∗
as time deducted from mean labor hours over working years.

33

required minimum asset balance of about $240,000, which is high compared to average investors’
asset levels. Column 2 of Panel A shows that eliminating the minimum fee for advisory services
would raise welfare by 1.43%, compared to the case where no delegation is available. This
welfare improvement results from the fact that less-wealthy investors gain access to cheapter
financial advice, allowing them to use their time for leisure or work. Column 2 of Panel B shows
that, compared to the baseline case, eliminating the minimum fee leads younger investors (age
20-35) to increase their usage of a financial advisor by 15% percentage points, and in retirement,
financial advice utilization rises by about 8%. At the same time, both inertia and active
management decline. Conversely, as seen in Column 3, Panel A, a higher minimum fee
commensurate with the industry’s average required minimum balance of around $250,000 cuts
the welfare gains by about 20%, compared to the case of no minimum fee (Column 2). In Panel B,
Column 3, we see that very few people, mainly those at the top of the wealth distribution, access
the servce at this higher cost. Only about 1.8% of young investors (aged 20~35) select the
delegation option and during retirement, only about 15% seek financial advice.32 Compared to
the no minimum fee case (Column 2), a higher minimum fee induces the young (age 20-35) and
older (age 65+) investors to choose more inertia than middle-aged investors. In this case, when
portfolio adjustment becomes necessary, most people find it optimal to manage their money
themselves (i.e., actively manage), rather than to pay the high advisory fee (i.e., delegation). In
other words, lowering the entry barrier to financial advisory services can help people of all ages
(especially the young and the old) manage their financial assets optimally, and thereby save their
scarcest resource, time for accumulating more job-specific skills or enjoying leisure.

32

With this level of minium fee, retirees (aged +65) become the main customer group.
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7.

Conclusion
Though individuals are increasingly expected to manage their own finances with

ever-more complex financial products, most people in fact exhibit investor inertia, devoting only
sparse attention to their financial portfolios and fail to actively manage their finances. To
understand what might seem to be puzzling behavior, we build and solve a realistically-calibrated
life cycle model where the time cost required to manage one’s portfolio is traded off with the
opporutnity to accumulate job-specific knowledge. Using reasonable parameters, we show that
our model implies sensible patterns of portfolio inertia across age groups. Investors who can
accumulate job-specific knowledge by working tend to devote less time to managing their money
when young. Middle-age individuals have more assets to invest and suffer less from the
opportunity costs of active portfolio management, though many still elect inertia. Declining
decision making efficiency and rising mortality risk later in life prompts many older investors to
elect portfolio inertia. When investors can delegate portfolio management to a financial advisor,
this enables many to avoid portfolio inertia. In general, our model predicts that younger and older
investors will find financial advisors most attractive. Finally, we find important welfare gains
result from having a delegation option.
This research contributes to a growing body of research on decision making over the life
cycle,33 an area of substantial policy interest in the wake of the global financial crisis. In the US
for instance, the White House recently convened a multi-agency meeting of behavioral
economists and psychologists to better understand how decision making changes with age (NIA
2013). Our work adds to the discussion by developing and simulating a life cycle model to
illustrate optimal portfolio management methods selected by finitely-lived investors who face

33

For instance, see Agarwal et al. (2009); Korniotis and Kumar (2011); and Samanez-Larkin and Knutson (2014).
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portfolio management costs and an age-dependent inefficiency pattern for financial decision
making.
One topic we do not take up here is the possibility of a conflict of interest between an
investor seeking to maximize his utility, and his financial advisor seeking to maximize his own
income.34 For example, if an advisor’s compensation is commission-based, he may be more
likely to encourage return-chasing or high-fee actively managed mutual funds (Mullainathan et al.
2012). The present paper considers only fee-based advice, which is less susceptible to such
conflicts, but future work could consider the potential for moral hazard if investors are
uninfomed. Additional extensions might also extend our model with parameter uncertainty and
learning (Brennan 1998; Xia 2001). Nevertheless our key insight linking job-specific human
capital and portfolio inertia will still be relevant, as long as a time cost of financial management
has negative consequences for labor market earnings.
Our findings should be of interest to a variety of stakeholders including individual
investors, financial advisors, retirement plan sponsors, and policymakers. In particular, we show
that those who most value financial advisory services are the young and the older age groups, so
making such services available can enhance their well-being. Also of interest is the prediction
that some middle-aged clients will wish to continue actively manage their own financial assets,
even when a delegation option is available. Policymakers could do more to enhance welfare gains
by improving investor access to financial advisory services. When financial advisors with
fiduciary responsibility can help investors manage their financial wealth optimally, this will
enable more people to accrue job-specific skills, thus contributing to the economy as a whole.

34

See for instance Bergstresser et al. (2009), Hackethal et al. (2012) and Stoughton et al. (2011).
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Table 1: Parameter Values for Numerical Solution of Baseline Model

Parameter

Baseline Value

Working periods

45

Retirement periods

35

Time discounting β

0.96

Risk aversion γ

3

Leisure preference α
Experience formulation
Elasticity of

1.0
a

0.0462
0.7596

accumulation

Depreciation of Human Capital

0.16%+0.023595 year

Inefficiency of financial decision making ϕ

.

.

Std. dev. of permanent wage shock

30 +0.03
0.0710

Std. dev. of human capital shock

0.0434

Std. dev. of transitory wage shock (pre-retirement)

0.1726

Std. dev. of transitory earnings shock
(post-retirement)
Replacement rate

0.28
20% of maximum earnings at age 65

Risk premium

0.04

Std. dev. of stock return

0.205

Risk free rate

1.01

Delegation annual fee: variable rate

1. 41% per annum

(1.41% of
Delegation annual fee: fixed fee
min. req’d balance of $150,000)
Correlation between wage and stock return σ

$2,115
0.0

Initial wealth for simulation

0

Initial human capital for simulation

10

Initial stock balance for simulation Z

0

Initial wage shock for simulation
Notes: This table summarizes our baseline model parameter settings.

0.1
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Table 2: Portfolio Inertia and Stock Trading Behavior over the Life Cycle
Total Wealth

Total Wealth < $150,000
Inertia
Age

Active Management

Inertia

$150,000

Active Management

No Trade

Bought

Sold

No Trade

Bought

Sold

20-35

0.783

0.156

0.061

0.133

0.623

0.244

36-50

0.665

0.143

0.192

0.202

0.426

0.372

51-65

0.750

0.108

0.142

0.164

0.386

0.450

66+

0.755

0.101

0.143

0.029

0.382

0.589

Notes: This table shows the proportion of investors by total wealth and age who exhibited inertia (i.e., no
stock purchase), purchased additional stock, or sold stock. Results tabulated from 2,000 independent
simulation runs of base case model without a delegation option. The cut-off point for total wealth (see
equation 8) is based on the medium level of wealth for middle-aged investors.
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Table 3: Dynamics of Portfolio Management over the Life Cycle with No Delegation Option
Mean

Std

Median

5%-Q

95%-Q

N

No. of switches

11.55

7.02

12.00

0.00

22.00

2,000

Years of inertia

45.97

25.00

42.00

13.00

80.00

2,000

Years of active mgmt

34.03

25.00

38.00

0.00

67.00

2,000

First year of active mgmt

8.95

8.23

7.00

4.00

24.00

1,767

Notes: Results tabulated from 2,000 simulation runs of base case model. No. of switches refers to the
number of times someone changed portfolio management method (from active-managed to inertia or vice
versa) between age 20 and 100, conditional on survival. Years of inertia refers to the total length of the
inertia period for specific simulated life cycle paths, and years of active mgmt refers to the total length of
the active management period over specific simulated life cycle paths. First year of active mgmt refers to
the first year when an individual changes from inertia to active management. Some people never elect
active management and remain inactive throughout their entire lifetimes which is why the total number of
observations of first year of active mgmt is less than the total number of simulations.

Table 4: Dynamics of Portfolio Management over the Life Cycle with a Delegation Option
Mean

Std

Median

5%-Q

95%-Q

N

No of switches

18.82

10.74

22.00

0.00

33.00

2,000

Years of inertia

44.94

25.49

40.00

11.00

80.00

2,000

Years of active mgmt

17.69

11.42

20.00

0.00

34.00

2,000

Years of delegation

17.36

15.93

15.00

0.00

42.00

2,000

First year change

8.39

7.94

6.00

4.00

21.00

1,778

14.31
9.26

8.44
10.35

13.00
6.00

7.00
4.00

26.00
29.00

1,776
1,581

First year active mgmt
First year delegation

Notes: For definitions, see Table 3. Also Years of delegation refers to the length of the delegated
management period for the specified simulated life cycle paths. First year delegation refers to the first
year when people change to delegation from inertia or from active management. Results tabulated from
2,000 simulation runs of base case model. Some people never elect active management or delegation
which is why the total number of observations of first year of active mgmt and first year delegation is less
than the total number of simulations.
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Table 5: Portfolio Management Transitions and Equity Choice Over the Life Cycle: With a
Delegation Option
A. Choice of Portfolio Management Method by Age (%)
Age

20-35

36-50

50-65

65-80

80+

Total

Inertia

73.39

50.87

49.3

44.43

61.22

56.18

Active mgmt

7.87

28.68

29.89

48.34

2.38

22.12

Delegation

18.73

20.45

20.81

7.23

36.39

21.7

B. Portfolio Management Transitions by Age, with a Delegation Option (%)
Age
Inertia to:
Inertia
Active mgmt
Delegation
Active management to:
Inertia
Active mgmt
Delegation

20-35

36-50

50-65

65-80

80+

Total

70.96
1.45
3.62

44.06
4.87
2.71

43.14
4.35
2.5

41.86
2.25
0.33

59.09
0.14
4.06

52.28
2.46
2.73

2.43
6.42
15.11

6.81
23.8
17.74

6.16
25.54
18.31

2.57
46.09
6.9

2.14
2.24
32.34

3.9
19.66
18.97

C. Equity Fraction out of Savings by Age (%)
Age

20-35

36-50

50-65

65-80

80+

Total

Inertia

0.333

0.622

0.572

0.482

0.483

0.484

Active mgmt

0.913

0.819

0.714

0.563

0.370

0.682

Delegation

0.743

0.715

0.653

0.461

0.371

0.548

Total

0.456

0.698

0.631

0.519

0.440

0.542

Notes: This table illustrates life cycle patterns of portfolio management methods and equity share when
delegation is feasible. Panel A shows the fraction of investors selecting inertia, active management, or
delegation by age. Panel B traces trasitions across portfolio management methods, given a delegation
option. Panel C depicts the average fraction of saving invested in equities depending on whether the
investor elects inertia, active management, or delegation. Savings is the total wealth minus consumption.
Averages are generated from 2,000 independent simulations for individuals based on optimal feedback
controls from the baseline specification of the life cycle model.
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Table 6: Change in Key Variables: With vs. Without a Delegation Option (%)
Age
20-35
36-50
51-65
66+

Total
Wealth
1.68
1.49
0.89
0.56

Equity
Share
1.68
1.56
2.14
1.21

Labor
Income
5.78
10.59
11.74
-

Consumption
4.22
9.24
12.79
0.18

Labor
Supply
5.44
9.07
9.69
-

Human
Capital
0.04
0.10
0.10
-

Leisure
2.09
3.49
3.73
6.69

Notes: The numbers represent the percentage increase in key variables for all individuals summed over
those in the age group having access to a delegation option versus not having access to a delegation
option. Equity share is a fraction of equity investment in savings ( ⁄
). Averages for total wealth
are value-weighted. See text.

Table 7: Factors Associated with Portfolio Inertia (versus Active Management) with No
Delegation Option: Marginal Effects from Descriptive Logit Analysis

(1)

Inertia Chosen (vs Active Management)
(2)
(3)

‐2.568***
(0.01)

‐2.571***
(0.01)
‐0.077***
(0.02)

‐0.083**
(0.04)

0.474***
(0.06)

1.009***
(0.09)

Notes: Each column reports the estimated impact of variables from separate Logit regressions, where the
dependent variable = 1 if the individual elected inertia in that period, or 0 = active management. The
fraction of observations experiencing inertia totaled 57.47% and active management 42.53%. Standard
errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See
text.
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Table 8: Factors Associated with Portfolio Inertia and Delegation (versus Inertia) with a Delegation
Option: Marginal Effects from Descriptive Multinomial Logit Analysis
A. Reference Group = Active Management
(1)

Inertia Chosen (vs Active Management)
(2)
(3)

‐2.499***
(0.05)

‐2.488***
(0.05)
‐0.218**
(0.09)

(1)

‐0.398***
(0.11)

2.654***
1.627***
(0.24)
(0.27)
Delegation Chosen (vs Active Management)
(2)
(3)

‐0.743***
(0.03)

‐0.744***
(0.03)
‐0.242**
(0.10)

‐0.371***
(0.10)

0.929***
(0.24)

0.556**
(0.25)

B. Reference Group = Inertia
Delegation Chosen (vs Inertia)
1.756***
(0.04)

1.744***
(0.04)
‐0.024
(0.10)

0.027
(0.11)

‐1.725***
(0.25)

‐1.071***
(0.27)

Notes: Each column reports the estimated impact of variables from separate Multinomial Logit
regressions where the dependent variable: 0 = inertia, 1= active, and 2 = delegation. Individual fixed
effects are controlled. Observations of active management account for 22.13% of the sample; inertia for
55.54%; and 22.33% for delegation respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See text.
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Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis: Change in Portfolio Management Method with No Delegation Option
(in percentage points)

Inertia

Wealth

Consumption

Labor supply

Stock holdings

Earnings

Human capital

(1)

(2)

Ages

Baseline

No Learning
by doing

20-35
36-50
50-65
65-80
80+
20-35
36-50
50-65
65-80
80+
20-35
36-50
50-65
65-80
80+
20-35
36-50
50-65
20-35
36-50
50-65
65-80
80+
20-35
36-50
50-65
65-80
80+
20-35
36-50
65-80
80+

0.760
0.516
0.500
0.444
0.633
0.429
1.016
1.326
1.238
0.793
0.227
0.271
0.299
0.219
0.236
0.446
0.381
0.335
0.191
0.398
0.343
0.261
0.117
0.264
0.273
0.276
0.175
0.177
1.080
1.213
1.279
1.279

0.859
0.662
0.609
0.564
0.712
0.242
0.694
1.033
1.019
0.658
0.132
0.191
0.236
0.197
0.213
0.246
0.267
0.258
0.094
0.225
0.220
0.159
0.075
0.153
0.202
0.227
0.166
0.167
1.066
1.154
1.218
1.237

(3)
Initial
Participation
Cost
0.774
0.522
0.507
0.447
0.631
0.421
1.004
1.320
1.237
0.796
0.228
0.270
0.298
0.219
0.236
0.449
0.381
0.335
0.181
0.393
0.342
0.257
0.115
0.266
0.274
0.276
0.175
0.177
1.081
1.214
1.280
1.280

(4)

(5)

Flat time
cost

College
Graduates

0.695
0.500
0.490
0.396
0.545
0.460
1.050
1.353
1.261
0.862
0.225
0.276
0.303
0.220
0.238
0.448
0.387
0.340
0.222
0.413
0.353
0.269
0.134
0.265
0.276
0.279
0.176
0.178
1.081
1.216
1.284
1.285

0.733
0.464
0.456
0.398
0.608
0.453
1.072
1.384
1.289
0.813
0.233
0.284
0.313
0.227
0.241
0.462
0.402
0.359
0.197
0.424
0.394
0.315
0.134
0.274
0.285
0.287
0.177
0.179
1.092
1.232
1.301
1.304

Notes: This table shows life cycle patterns of key variables for different model specifications. Column 1
uses baseline parameters as in Table 1. Columnn 2 shows results when human capital is deterministic over
the life cycle, without learning by doing. Column 3 shows results when an investor must pay a fixed initial
stock market participation cost in addition to recurring time cost. Column 4 provides results when the time
cost of active management is set at 3% for all ages. Column 5 shows results when the endogenous human
capital process is matched with the wage trend s for of college graduates in the PSID.

47

Table 10: Sensitivity Analysis: Welfare Gains and Change in Portfolio Management Method with a
Delegation Option (in percentage points)
A. Welfare Gain from a Delegation Option (%)

Welfare Gain

Baseline
(1)

No minimum fee
(2)

Current industy level
(3)

1.1897

1.4251

0.9886

B. Sensitivity Analysis of Portfolio Management Methods (%)

Delegation

Inertia

Active
mgmt

Ages

Baseline
(1)

No minimum fee
(2)

Current industry level
(3)

20-35
36-50
51-65
65+
20-35
36-50
51-65
65+
20-35
36-50
51-65
65+

18.73
20.45
20.81
23.89
73.39
50.87
49.30
54.03
7.87
28.68
29.89
22.08

33.57
33.09
26.78
31.13
64.38
49.15
49.15
50.32
2.05
17.76
24.07
18.56

1.84
5.10
7.73
15.54
75.78
51.77
50.44
54.98
22.37
43.13
41.82
29.49

Note: Panel A presents welfare gain/loss of having a delegation option versus a no-delegation base case,
for alternative model specifications on minimum fixed delegation fees. Welfare Gain is the percentage
increase in certainty-equivalent consumption stream compared to the no-delegation (baseline) case. Panel
B describes the proportion of investors electing each portflio management method under different
specifications on minimum fixed delegation. Delegation, Inertia,and Active mgmt refer to the proportions
of investors choosing delegation, inertia, and active management, respectively. Column 1 shows baseline
results with minimum fee of $2,115 (commensumrate with a minimum balance of $150,000). Column 2
provides results from having no minimum fee for delegation. Column 3 reports results from imposing a
minimum fee commensurate with a higher required minimum balance ($243,360), consistent with the
industry average.
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Figure 1: Life Cycle Profiles of Consumption, Earnings, Equity Share, Labor Supply, and
Human Capital with No Delegation Option
A. Earnings, Consumption, and Total Wealth

B.

Stock Account Balance

C. Labor Supply and Human Capital Accumulation

Notes: This Figure shows average life cycle profiles when only active management or inertia are feasible,
generated from 2,000 independent simulations based on optimal feedback controls from the baseline
specification of the life cycle model (see Table 1). Panel A displays average consumption, labor income
and total wealth paths in 2012 US dollars ($1,000s); Panel B shows the average amount of stock account
balance in 2012 US dollars ($1,000s); and Panel C depicts average work and human capital profiles.
Human capital is normalized by the initial level.
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Figure 2: Choice of Portfolio Management Method and Equity Share Over the Life Cycle:
No Delegation Option
A. Portfolio Management Method over the Life Cycle: No Delegation Option

B. Equity Shares Over the Life Cycle for Portfolio Management Method: No Delegation Option

Notes: This figure shows life cycle patterns of portfolio management method and equity shares selected
with no delegation option. Panel A shows the fraction of investors selecting inertia versus active
management by age. Panel B shows the life cycle pattern of equity shares depending on whether the
investor elects inertia or active management. Equity share is defined as stock holdings as a share of
in period conditional on each portfolio management approach. Averages are
savings ( /
generated from 2,000 independent simulations for individuals based on optimal feedback controls in the
baseline specification of the life cycle model.
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Figure 3: Scatter Plot of Stock Balances Conditional on Portfolio Management Method: No
Delegation Option

Notes: This figure shows a scatterplot of stock balances depending on whether the investor elected inertia
or active management last period. The solid line indicates average stock balances for each portfolio
management method. Averages generated from 2,000 independent simulations for individuals based on
optimal feedback controls from the baseline specification. Account balance in 2012 US$ (000).
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Appendix A: Derivation of Financial Advisor Fees
To evaluate fees charged by registered investment advisors (RIAs) in the U.S., we have
tallied information from disclosure documents (Form ADV) filed with the U.S. Securities and
Commissions (SEC) offic as of July 1, 2014. As is clear from Table A1, the percentage fee of
total asset under management is the most common fee type used by financial advisors, though
other charge structures are also found (percentages do not add to 100% as advisors use more than
one fee structure).
We also explored who these advisors’ clients were, and we found that most catered to
individual investors. As we wished to get realistic fees for individual investors, we focused on
advisors where individual clients comprised most (>three-quarters) of their practice of at least
100 clients. For our subsanple, the average percentage fee of total assets under management was
1.410% per year.
It is also worth noting that, for these advisors, minimum required account balances
averaged around $240,000. In our model, this threshold for adopting delegation would discourage
almost all investors. Accordingly, we explore sensitivity to this choice by setting a lower account
balance for delegation of $150,000 in Section 6.
Table A1: Type of Fees Charged by U.S. Financial Advisors
Type of Advisory Fee

Number (%) of advisers charging fee

Percentage of asset under management

10,727 (94.7%)

Fixed fee (other than subscription fee)

4,661 (41.2%)

Performance-based fee

4,354 (38.5%)

Hourly charge

3,174 (28.0%)

Commission

562 (5.0%)

Subscription fee

128 (1.1%)

Other

1,623 (14.3%)

Notes: This table presents the fee structure for financial advisory service the US. Source: Calculated by
authors from the Investment Advisor Public Disclosure (IAPD) Form ADV (part 1) of SEC-registered
independent advisors as of July 1, 2014. As advisorsmore than one type of fees, we tally all types charged
(so the columns do not sum to 100%.
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Appendix B. A Sufficient Condition for an Investor to Elect Portfolio Inertia
,∗
,∗
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, ,∗ , ,∗ be maximizers of the objective functions of a
Let
active management method and a portfolio inertia method, respectively. The following
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Discussion:
If next period’s labor and consumption levels resulting from porfolio active management are very
similar to those resulting from inertia, there will be a ‘dominant boundary of portfolio inertia’
where inertia will be preferred to active management. In other words, if an investor expects he
will end up choosing a similar consumption/labor supply pair next period, a small change in his
portfolio will be costly without enhancing his discounted lifetime utility. In such a case, it will
then be optimal for him not to alter his portfolio.
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Appendix C. Numerical Solution Procedure35
Here we describe our procedure for obtaining the numerical solution to the investor’s problem. In
0 and
0 (inertia), the investor maximizes his
the last period of life T, assuming
utility by consuming his available liquid assets (
) for every pair of state variables
, , ,
,
,
using their definitions and the
. In period T−1, we calculate
, , ,
Monte Carlo integration (based on 50 runs) of
, as well as
Nelder-Mead optimization over
,
,
. Of course,
in calculating
. We approxiate value functions using multi-linear interpolation for state variables not
contained in the discretized set of grids (see Brandt et al. 2005).
Accordingly, we get
,
,
,
max
,
,
. When
max
,
,
, portfolio inertia is optimal. Different choices of management
method are derived similarly. Iterating these steps until the first period, we get the value
which completely characterize the solution to the investor’s problem. Last, we
functions
generate 2,000 sample paths for individual investors using variations of the wage shock and
uncertain stock market returns
For multi-linear interpolation, we extend a one-variable linear interpolation to a multivariable
setting. Given a current state (
, , ,
), the next period’s realized state
(
,
,
,
) is determined by the current period’s choices (portfolio management
method:
, labor supply: l , equity investment amount: S , and consumption: C ) and
exogenous shocks (stock return: , shock to human capital: λ and persistent/transitory wage
shock). It is possible that the realized state variable set (
,
,
,
) does not belong
to a set of discretized state variables
,
,
,
in the next period. To address
, , ,
this issue, we find adjacent two state variables for each realized state variable. For example, for
a potential wealth level (
) in the next period, we find nearest two grid points,
and
among discretized wealth grids
such that
. For a realized
set of state variables (
,
,
,
), there will be 16 sets of close state variables
,
,
,
for which we know the value of value
,
,
,
,
functions
,
,
,
,
,
,
,…,
by preceding
backward value function iterations.
,
,
,
will be determined by a weighted sum of value
The value of V
functions of nearest state variables. We use the inverse of distance between realized state
variables and each set of close state variables as a weight for the corresponding value function.
Denote D , , , as the distance from
,
,
,
to
,
,
,
,
which is defined as the ordinary Euclidean distance:
D,

The corresponding weight (
35

.

, ,

, , ,

) is constructed as

This numerical procedure is implemented with FORTRAN90 and the GNU Gfortran compiler.
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, , ,
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D, ,
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∑
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D,
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Thus, the further distant the nearby state variables are from the realized state, the less weight will
be assigned to its value function. And of course, the sum of weights is equal to one by
construction (∑ , , ,
1).
The value of V
value functions:
V

,

,

,
,

,

,

is estimated as a weighted sum of adjacent
, , ,

,

,

,

The above interpolation method is implemented both in VFI and simulations finding the
maximized future continuous values and corresponding maximal choice variables (i.e., portfolio
management method, labor supply, equity investment, consumption). In the course of
implementation, we impose a restriction that the equity balance cannot exceed total wealth
).
(
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Appendix D. Calibrating the Learning by Doing Mechanism
This Appendix explains how we calibrate the parameters in the learning by doing mechanism.
We first estimated the parameters by matching wage profiles generated by a learning by doing
mechanism with the conventional wage profile in the life cycle portfolio choice literature (e.g.,
Gomes and Michaelides 2005; Cocco et al. 2005). To be precise, we generated 3,000 life cycle
wage paths based on age-dependent wage trend for male high school graduates, assuming an
idiosyncratic wage shock and a permanent wage shock with the parameters reported in Hubener
et al. (2013). We also generate 3,000 life cycle paths of wages based on our learning by doing
mechanism (formula (2)), allowing varying levels of skill formation uncertainty (λ), the
depreciation rate for human capital, learning efficiency (a), returns to scale (θ), and idiosyncratic
and permanent wage shocks with an assumed level of average labor supply level (0.35).
For each potential candidate set of parameters, we calculated moment conditions by year of age
including average and standard deviation of wages, skewness and kurtosis of mean wages, and
maximum and minimum average wages. Then we estimated these parameters by minimizing the
numerical distance between moment conditions generated by learning by doing mechanism with
labor market shocks and moment conditions generated by the conventional wage profile as in
Hubener et al. (2013). An illustration of the match is presented below.
Figure A1: A normalized wage profile matched with the empirical wage profile

Note: This figure shows patterns of average wage profiles generated by the human capital accumulation
process with labor market shocks (dotted line) and the empirical data from the PSID (solid line). The wage
path is normalized by the first year’s wage.

